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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
'STATE OF GEORGIA 
TARA SCOTT; BAILEY M. CARTER; and ) 
WILSON CARTER, Individually, as Trustee ) 
of THE WILSON M. CARTER 1988 ) 
TRUST, and as Next Friend of MARY ) 
WILSON CARTER, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
JOHN J. CARR and ) 
JOJ--IN MATTHEW DWYER, III, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Civil Action 
file No. 20l7CV297083 
Bus. Case Div. 2 
ORDER REGARDING TIMELINESS OF PLAINTIFFS 
BAILEY M. CARTER AND MARY WILSON CARTER'S CLAIMS 
Following a June 28, 2018 hearing in the above styled matter, the Court permitted 
additional briefing on the statute of limitations defense raised in Defendant Carr's Motions to 
Dismiss and Defendant Dwyer's Motion for Judgment on tbe Pleadings with respect to the 
claims asserted by Bailey M. Carter ("Bailey) and Mary Wilson Carter ("Mary'').1 Having 
considered the motions and the supplemental briefing, the Court finds as follows: 
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 
In this action Plaintiffs allege Defendants Carr and Dwyer violated state and federal 
securities laws and committed other torts when they solicited and sold to Plaintiffs shares in 
Vantage Corporation ("Vantage"). Plaintiffs assert that at the time they were sold the Vantage 
shares: the stock was not a federal covered security, was not subject to an effective registration 
Although the argument raised in Defendant Carr's Amended Motion to Dismiss (which Defendant Dwyer 
incorporates by reference in his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings) on this issue is directed at Bailey M. Carter, 
insofar as the same argument and rationale may apply to the claims asserted by Mary Wilson Carter as the other 
substituted party, the Court addresses the claims of Bailey and Mary collectively herein. 
1 
statement and was not exempt from registration; Defendants received direct or indirect 
compensation for their role in soliciting investments from them in Vantage but were not 
registered as securities salespeople or as investment advisors; and Defendants made misleading 
statements of materiaJ fact and omissions when soliciting Plaintiffs, inducing them to purchase 
shares and to hold their investments in Vantage, causing them lo suffer damages. 
Plaintiffs initiated this action on Oct. 25, 2017. The original Complaint names as 
Plaintiffs Wilson Carter as Trustee of the Bailey Middleton Carter 2009 Trust and the Mary 
Wilson Carter 2009 Trust (collectively the "Trusts"), among others, based on a Schedule K-1 
provided by Vantage naming the Trusts as shareholders. However, the shares purportedly 
purchased by the Trusts were actually purchased by Bailey and Mary, individually and on their 
own behalf, as shown by their respective Stock Subscription Agreements and the corresponding 
Stock Certificates. Upon Defendants raising an objection as to the Trusts' standing to pursue 
claims related to Bailey and Mary's stock, Plaintiffs moved to substitute Bailey and Mary, 
individually. in the place of the Trusts. This Court granted the Motion to Substitute on June 29, 
2018. 
ANALYSIS 
The issue currently before the Court is whether certain claims brought by Bailey and 
Mary, individually, are time barred. 
A. Statute of Limitations and Relation Back 
Claims for the sale of unregistered securities in violation of O.C.G.A. §10-5-20 (count 1)2 
and for the sale of securities by an individual not properly registered as an agent in violation of 
O.C.G.A. § l 0-5-31 (count ll)3 must be "instituted within two years after the violation occurred." 
2 See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, ~ii 72-78; Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint,~~ 91-97. 
See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint,~~ 79-82; Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint,~~ 98-10 I. 
2 
O.C.G .A. § 10-5-580). Claims alleging the violation of 15 U .S.C. §77.l(a)(2). Section l 2(a)(2) of 
the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") (count III)4must be brought "within one year after the 
discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made 
by the exercise of reasonable diligence." 15 U.S.C.A. § 77m. 
Further. insofar as Bailey and Mary were not named parties in the original complaint and 
first sought to assett claims in this action in Plaintiffs· First Amended Complaint, filed on Mar. 
26, 2018, a key issue with respect to Defendants' statute of limitations defense is whether Bailey 
and Mary's claims relate back to the filing of the original Complaint. The Civil Practice Act 
allows claims to relate back to the date of the original pleading whenever the claim or defense 
asserted in an amended pleading arises out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth i11 the original pleading. O.C.G.A. § 9-l 1-15(c). O.C.G.A. § 9-11-l5(c) 
further provides: 
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted 
relates back to the date of the original pleadings if the foregoing 
provisions are satisfied, and if within the period provided by law for 
commencing the action against him the party to be brought in by 
amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that 
he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) 
knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity 
of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him. 
Georgia law has established that relation back under O.C.G.A. § 9-1 l-15(c) is applicable 
to both plaintiffs and defendants. See Dover Place Apartments v. A & M Plumbing & Heating 
Co., 167 Ga. App. 732, 734, 307 S.E.2d 530,533 (1983) (quoting Gordon v. Gillespie, 135 Ga. 
App. 369, 375, 217 S.E.2d 628, 633 (1975)) ("It is now well settled ... that relation back occurs 
both as to the plaintiff and the defendant when the new and old parties have such an identity of 
interest that it can be assumed, or proved, that relation back is not prejudicial; and that the new 
See Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, ,j,i 83-87; Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. ,i~ I 02-106. 
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'cause of action' 'arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be 
set forth in the original pleadings ... ' provided other requirements are also met").5 As noted by 
the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Dover Place Apartments, 
[s]tatutes of limitations are designed to ensure that parties are given formal 
and reasonable notice that a claim is being asserted against them. 
[O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-15(c)] ... is ... based on the idea that a party who is 
notified of litigation concerning a given transaction or occurrence is 
entitled to no more protection from statutes of limitations than one who is 
informed of the precise legal description of the right sought to be 
enforced. 
Id. 167 Ga. App. at 733-34 (citations omitted). 
B. Findings and Conclusions of Law 
Here, in their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs contend: Defendant Dwyer first 
began soliciting Plaintiffs in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ I 0-5-20 and I 0-5-31 and Section l 2(a)(2) 
of the 1933 Act in December 20156; Defendant Carr began such solicitations in January 20167; 
and Defendants continued the allegedly illegal solicitations through December 2016.8 Given this 
action was initiated on Oct. 25, 2017, Plaintiffs' causes of action predicated on alleged violations 
of O.C.G.A. §§ ] 0-5-20 and I 0-5-31 as first asserted in the original Complaint, were filed within 
the two-year statute of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. § I 0-5-580). Although the Section 
12(a)(2) claim, 15 U.S.C. §771 (a)(2), is generally subject to a one year limitations period "from 
Although Defendants invite the Court to reconsider these holdings under a "plain and ordinary" reading of 
O.C.G.A. §9-11-1 S(c), these decisions are binding on this Court. Further, in holding that §9-11-1 S(c) is applicable to 
both plaintiffs and defendants, the appellate courts in Dover Place Apartments and Gordon expressly recognized that 
federal courts have reached the same conclusion in construing the federal rule upon which §9-11-1 S(c) is based, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). See, e.g., Cliffv. Pavco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc .. 363 F.3d 1113, 1132 (I Ith 
Cir. 2004) ("This extension of Rule 15(c)(3) to amendments involving plaintiffs rests on solid ground. When Ruic 
I 5(c) was amended in 1966, the advisory committee wrote: 'The relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs is 
not expressly treated in revised Rule I 5(c) since the problem is generally easier. Again the chief consideration of 
policy is that of the statute of limitations, and the attitude taken in revised Rule I 5(c) toward change of defendants 
extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs''') (citing Fecl.R.Civ.P. 15 Advisory Committee's note to the 
1966 Amendment). 
6 See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, ~140-41. 
7 lei. at~ 42. ~ Id. at ,1 73. 
4 
the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission. or after such discovery should have been 
made by the exercise of reasonable diligence" (15 U.S.C. §77m), the Court finds the timeliness 
of the l 2(a)(2) claim is a factual issue turning on questions of discovery and reasonable 
diligence, matters which cannot be resolved as a matter of law based on the pleadings. 
Turning to the claims asserted by Bailey and Mary, the Court finds their claims for 
violations of§§ 10-5-20 and 10-5-31 and Section 12(a)(2) relate back to the filing of the original 
Complaint. Baily and Mary's claims arise out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading-the aUeged misrepresentations and omissions 
of Defendants that Plaintiffs allege induced them to purchase and hold their Vantage stock. 
Further, Defendants received notice of this action shortly after it was initiated and have 
participated fully in this litigation such that Defendants "will not be prejudiced in maintaining 
(their] defense on the merits". O.C.G.A. §9-l l-15(c). Indeed, there is a clear identity of interest 
between the new parties, Bailey and Mary, and the old parties, Bailey and Mary's respective 
Trusts, such that it can be presumed that relation back is not prejudicial. See Dover Place 
Apartments, supra; Gordon, supra. Moreover, Defendants knew or should have known that, as 
the actual owners of the Vantage stock, Bailey and Mary were the proper parties to this action 
and but for a Schedule K-1 issued by Vantage (Defendants' alleged principal/employer) 
erroneously naming the Trusts as shareholders, the proper parties likely would have been named 
in the original Complaint. 
Given all of the above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' motions to the extent they 
seek dismissal of Bailey and Mary's claims asserted pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ I 0-5-20, 10-5-31 
and Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act on statute of limitations grounds. 
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SO ORDERED this 'LS day of July, 2018. 
Fulton County Superior Court 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
Served upon registered service contact through cFileGA: 
S. Lawrence Polk 
EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (US) LLP 
999 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 2300 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3996 
Tel: (404) 853-8000 
Fax: (404) 853-8806 
larrypo I k(q).evershecls-su therland. com 
Gregory J. Digel 
HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 
1180 West Peachtree Street, NW, Suite 1800 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3407 
Tel: (404) 817-8500 
Fax: (404) 881-0470 
ureu.digel@hklaw.com 
Counselfor Defendant John .J. Carr 
James D. Blitch IV 
BLITCH LAW, P.C. 
191 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 3285 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1740 
Tel: (404) 221-0401 
Fax: (404) 221-0402 
jim@blitchlavv.com 
Counselfor Defendant Mal/hew Dwyer, Ill 
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